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Introduction
My first year of undergrad, I sat in a still hallway and held my head in disbelief as I saw
the confetti fall on Donald Trump as he accepted the presidential nomination. Was this just
another horrific episode of The Apprentice? During the election cycle, a term was used to
describe his meteoric rise: populism. The term was thrown around with ease, yet the definition
was not ever really articulated. Then as other countries held elections, other political leaders
came to power under the populist label: Modi in India, Johnson in the United Kingdom,
Bolsanaro in Brazil, Duterte in the Philippines, and that is just to name a few. Coming into the
theoretical side of the term, it seemed ripe with contested definitions and I knew that it would be
something that I would want to research.While populist movements have risen across the globe,
old definitions of populism are no longer viable in the 21st century. Literature on populism from
1990 forward characterizes populism as an appeal to ‘the people’, crisis, breakdown, threats, and
‘bad manners’ (Moffit and Tormey, 2014). We need to consider the theoretical and empirical
lapses of populism -- as an ideology, logic, and discourse in order to understand contemporary
populism as a political style. In addition, it is necessary to reconceptualize the effect that
technology has on populism. Technological systems that I will include are embedded into the
social media and new media we interact with on a daily basis, so long as we are connected to the
internet, we are subject to them.
I will work predominantly with Moffit’s interpretation of populism as a political style. A
political style can be interpreted as reproties of performance. Moffitt’s theory coalesces the
elements of past theorists’ notions of political style while adding important rhetorical and
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aesthetic dimensions Hofstader (1965; Ankersmit 2002; Pels 2003). Moffitt claims that there are
“repertoires of embodied, symbolically mediated performance made to audiences that are used to
create and navigate the fields of power that comprise the political, stretching from the domain of
government to everyday life.” (2016, 38). In other words, populism as a political style is
performed through symbols and images that are constructed by the populist actor. In this view,
‘the people’ are the central audience to the populist leader and are also the subject that populist
leaders attempt to ‘render present’, in other words, they act for the ‘people’ they claim to
represent ( Arditi 2007). The concept of populism as a political style is applicable to the
performative nature of politics that is particularly salient in this era of social media and new
media. Additionally, I speculate that the phenomena of populism as a political style has become
so global due to the crisis of public authority.
I claim that Moffitt’s application of mediatization to political style doesn’t adequately
expose new media and social media’s effect on populism. Although the effect of increasing the
role of mediatization,which is how “social interaction-within these (political) institutions,
between institutions, and society at large-take place via the media '' (Hjarvard 2008,113), it
precludes the social media platforms that are in place that are replicating populism. We cannot
start to conceptualize contemporary populism without bringing the technology most often used
by contemporary populists or by actors who use this political style. The books I relied on the
most in my research are, New Dark Age b y James Bridle and The Global Rise of Populism by
Benjamin Moffitt.. To conceptualize the impact of technology on populism as a political style, I
use critical perspectives on mediatization and new media technology (KhosraviNik 2018, Bridle
2018, Niklewicz 2017). These scholars deconstruct the opaque operations of algorithms, filter
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bubbles and echo chambers to provide insight into how contemporary populism operates. I will
situate populism as a political style and how it is replicated by the technology behind our social
media platforms, that seems to be splicing itself to our social reality.
Literature Review
Populism has been classically characterized as a particular ideology. For Mudde (2004),
populism is a “thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two
homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘corrupt elite,’ which argues that
politics should be the general will of the people” (543). The thin centered ideology of populism
is then able to be attached to whatever the socio-political context that the populist actor
mobilizes under, meaning that it doesn’t exist as a pure ideology. (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2011,
2). Populism in this view can latch onto a ‘thick’ ideology such as socialism or nationalism,
meaning that there is no pure form of populism as an ideology. The thin centered ideology of
populism is the conflict between two separate and opposite groups. For instance, the ‘pure
people’ and the ‘corrupt elite’.
Even those who conceptualize populism as a distinct ideology acknowledge the lack of
evidence of an actual historical populist ideological movement. There has been no record of
philosophical-political institutions that are the basis for populism as an ideology. There is no
‘Populist International’ (Stanley 2008, 100). The minimal definition of a ‘thin ideology’ for
populism has yet to ‘thicken’. The concept of populism as an ideology lacks a common historical
lineage, besides the one instance of a so-called populist party, known as the American People’s
Party of the 1890s (Moffitt 2016, 19). Other ‘thin ideologies’ started as such and would
eventually develop their own unique conceptual furniture to extend their appeal and validity
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(Freeden 1996, 486). Examples of this include ecologism and feminism which both started with
core values to develop into their own thick ideologies. Thus, populism as an ideology doesn't
help conceptualize populism for it isn’t an actual ideology. Populism in this lense just latches
onto another ideology, common today is a nationalist ideology with populist style.
Some of the most famous work on populism was the work of Ernesto Laclau, who
focused on the ontological content of populism. Laclau argued that populism is not just a
political logic, but the logic of thep olitical as politics is always the struggle between two
competing antagonistic groups (2005, 154). Laclau framed the groups in a simple politicosocial
unit called ‘the demand’. When the demand is not satisfied with the system, the people have the
possibility to come into contact with the unsatisfied demands. The unsatisfied demands form a
common antagonism or enemy. Put into a different way populism is a political logic of where
equivalence triumphs over difference (Moffit 2016, 23). The unsatisfied demands form an
equivalential chain that bifurcates the system and the people (Moffit 2016, 23). Here is where we
can see the adoption of the most common understanding of populism. The ‘people ‘ versus the
‘system’ , or whatever rhetorical flourish is used by the populist. Laclau formulates that all
politics are populist, since populism is the logic of the political (Laclau 2005, 47).
Laclau argues in his later work that the populist does not speak for a common people, but
makes the subject known as ‘the people’ through naming, performance or articulation (Moffit
2016, 24). The performance that Laclau turns to is vital to populism as a political style. Populism
starts from the perception of crisis, breakdown or threat, which is often performed or dramatized
(Taggart 2000). As we noted earlier, the unsatisfied demand. Laclau was concerned with
moving away from the concrete specifics of ‘politics’ and working with a more abstract level of
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the “political” (Mouffe 2005, 8-9), which is important to consider when thinking of
contemporary politics.
However we also need to look at how modern movements have managed to stray away
from the ‘populist logic’ that Laclau sees as universal (Arditi 2012). The movements broke the
logic of the way they organized as a populist organization. Occupy and indignandoes h ave
sought to distance themselves from “populist modes of discourse, organization and
representation by refusing to articulate demands through a leader, or not articulating concrete
demands at all” (Moffit 2016, 25). The universal logic of populism depends on a leader, such as
JoséMujica, former president of Uruguay, known as Pepe. These organizations flipped the
people and put it before the leader.The additional shortcoming of populism as political logic is
that it is too broad to allow for meaningful application. The political logic that he considers
populism is too abstract. If we were to consider his theory and apply it, the political logic of
populism would be applicable to any political case study. Laclau’s theory definitely was one of
the most innovative and developed, but in order to be used for more empirical analysis the theory
must be “brought back to Earth in some regards” (Moffit 2016, 25). The work of populism as a
political logic noted the importance of performance in order to ‘speak’ to ‘the people’,which is
necessary to populism as a political style.
Populism can alternatively be understood as a mode of political expression as manifested
in text or speeches (Moffit 2016, 21). In other words, a populist actor can enter in and out of
populist discourse. Both populism as an ideology and populism as a strategy divide populism in a
“either/or” category. Either you fall into the category of a populist or you don’t. For instance,
although Donald Trump employs a populist discourse, his ideology is not populism, but
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nationalism entrenched in xenophobia. It is also important to note that Bernie Sanders is often
labeled a populist as well whose discourse evokes a political revolution against ‘the corporate
elite’, but his ideology is a closer to a democratic socialist (Postel 2016).This situates populism
as a political style as not tied down to ideological leaning, but rather how they approach their
conflicts. A populist discourse usually makes appeals to’ the people’, speaking about a crisis or
breakdown, and to ‘bad manners’ (Moffit 2016). The populist performs this crisis to the
‘people” and how there is some crisis that is affecting the ‘pure people’, which serves as a sort of
rallying cry. ‘Bad manners’ can reference instances where the populiust stepped out of what was
‘politically correct’. An example of this is how the populist actors appear when they speak, for
Hugo Chavez presents himself as a ‘man of the people’, wearing ordinary clothes (Moffitt 2016,
55). The performance of the populist actor is most commonly: (1) appeals to ‘the people,’ (2)
reference to a crisis or breakdown, and (3) reference to ‘bad manners’ or bad actors/a system that
is not working for ‘the people.’
Scholars have used classical content analysis to develop a qualitative coding scheme to
measure the ‘level’ of populism in certain discursive texts (Hawkins 2009, 2010; Kroopmans and
Muis 2009). However, there seems to be no clear agreement on what sources should be used for
analysis in this method. Whether it is speeches, party manifestos or broadcasts it is hard to see
how measuring the keywords used would do more than supplement an already existing
theoretical assumption (Moffit 2016, 23). This method seems to measure p opulism, rather than
understand populism. This approach measures how often the populist amount of times the
populist leader will say ‘people’ or something along those lines.To understand populism, you
need to break down these theoretical assumptions that you are basing your measurement off of.
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The discursive approach helps understand the gradational quality of populism and values the
importance of speech acts or rhetoric, but it fails to include the performative and aesthetic
dimensions that some theorists have stressed as significant to populism (Canovan 1999; Mouffe
2005). This methodological approach leaves out charismatic and stylistic elements of populism,
which is important to understand populism as a political style.
It is necessary to situate the shifting understanding of populism within the changing shape of the
modern political system. Populism as a political style stresses the performative elements of
populism and contextualizes it in the conditions of reflexive modernity(Moffitt 2016, 39).
Reflexive modernity is the dissolution of conventional institutions and the rise of transnational
movements. (Beck 2006). Reflexive modernity characterizes the modern era, where rampant
media and technology allow constant flow of information which can shift political institutions
rapidly
Moffitt fuses works on political communication and the media to conceptualize
contemporary populism by introducing the concept of political style -- defined as “repertoires of
performance that are used to create political relations” (2013, 387). Knight describes populism as
a loose style involving a rapport with ’the people’, and that signals a “them-and-us” mentality
that can precipitate a mobilization of the ‘us’ versus the ‘them’ (1998, 223). Similar to the ‘pure
people’ and ‘corrupt elite’ of earlier theorists. Populist theorists have conventionally focused on
populism’s rhetorical features, speeches, rallies and the likes (Taguieff 1995, Kazin 1998,
Canovan 1999, de la Torre, 2010, and Filc 2011). They refer to the use of populism to
communicate in a simple manner and offer solutions that are direct and simplistic. Moffitt's
notion of “populism as a political style” goes beyond the purely rhetorical elements to emphasize
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the performative and relational elements of populism. For instance, populism as a political style
pays attention to how the populist actors appear and thus perform a role for their supporters. We
can think of ‘the people’ as an empty signifier that the populist actors perform to fill (Laclau
2005). Populist actors need to be able to speak for the people, so they need to make sure that they
fit the part.
Political style has been used as a placeholder, just a term that had no defined meeting, in
both political science and political communication literature. So, it is necessary to define what
Moffitt means by political style in relation to populism. Political style has been something
ephemeral that has not been pinned down when used in literature. Almost automatically people
associate the word ‘style’ with aesthetics, theatre and fashion. For this reason, the political
science and political communication literature have relegated style to being a superficial aspect
of politics (Moffitt 2016, 33). Style can be defined in two ways, the first equates style with
patterns, grouping objects or phenomena with similar traits to organize them in a comprehensible
schematic (Moffitt 2016, 33). This definition has been used in art history, describing works of art
that are made in a similar fashion or at the same time or place (Ackerman 1962). The second
usage prioritizes the content of style. Goodman argues that “subject is what is said, style is how”
(1975, 799). When we are describing a style of art, we are actually doing two things: first, we are
taking part in a grouping activity, and second, we are basing our judgement on what to include in
each grouping on how it is painted rather than what is painted. Style’s definitions tend to be
intertwined when put to practical use, leading to the slippage of the term when used in politics.
In politics, style and content should not be conflated. The content of what a populist actor is
saying can vary based on how it is presented. Again, Moffit defines populism as a political style:
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“repertoires of embodied, symbolically mediated performance made to audiences that are used to
create and navigate the fields of power that comprise the political, stretching from the domain of
government to everyday life” (2016, 38). The definition of a political style is a necessary
component of contemporary politics, especially for understanding populism. The stylistic
performance can be embodied through speech, how the populist or other imagery is presented.
The political actor can frame issues within the technocratic style or step out into the populist
political style when necessary and isn’t stagnated by the ‘either/ or’ categorization.This also is
necessary to understand that populism as a political style is constructed by the populist actor,
both actively and passively (Moffit 2016, 38).

Theoretical framework
The stylistic choice of populism thrives in the modern media ecosystem, where the
attention of the user is dwindling.The populist style can be subtle with how the populist actor
dresses. The populist will find a group of like-minded people and usually refer to them as ‘good
people’ in opposition to whatever antagonistic group they are confronted with. Populism as a
political style dependent on the new media and social, and notes how new media and social
media has changed the dynamics of the populist actors' visibility. Users are constantly trying to
find their ‘people’, other users who might share some common beliefs. Populist actors can appeal
to ‘their people’ through social media, changing their messages to suit the needs of whomever
they claim to represent. The social media and new media technology has made it easy for
populism to replicate itself and spread, which I will discuss further in my findings section.
Seeing populism as a political style goes beyond the traditional understanding of content and
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style that past approaches relied on. For instance. A current example, Donald Trump, the
President of the United States, uses a populist style to reinforce a nationalist content. Populism as
a political style recognizes the rhetorical, relational and aesthetic aspects that are crucial to
framing populism in the contemporary media ecosystem. How the poupulist actors speak/write,
how they relate to ‘the people’ and how they look to ‘the people.’When there is an emphasis on
the performative elements of populism, we can give populism a strong footing in the
progressively ‘stylized’ and ‘spectacular’ political landscape (Debord 1994, Vaneigem 1994).
There is a need to dramatize a crisis to give a starting point for populism. Populism as a political
style makes ‘the people’ the central feature of populism, as well as the subject that populists
attempt to ‘render present’ (Arditi 2007). Meaning, the populist actor performs for a group
through mechanisms of representation, namely mediated enactments, television, social media,
rallies, to allow a symbolic link of disparate identities. The populist actor is performing the role
they wish to be, they are the actor and director of the movie simultaneously (Moffit 2016, 49).
Mediatization refers to the process in which social and political institutions and modes of
interaction have changed as a consequence of the growth of social media’s influence (Hjarvard
2008,114). Mediatization allows the populist actor’s performances to reach “the people” in
unprecedented ways. This can be seen in the development of new media technologies as more
and more populist actors are able to reach their audience with social media and new media
outlets. Now ‘common people’ can engage with populist actors, allowing their populist message
to be catered to individuals. Tweets and videos of a populist actor can reach the people who are
supportive of the message like never before. Populism as a political style is performed and
enacted by the populist leader, where the performance is essentially a term for how “‘juridical
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power’ inevitably “produces”, what they claim to represent’” (Butler 1990, 2). The populist actor
then is able to capture ‘the people’ that are needed in the symbolic identity of ‘the common
people”, which is possible through the process of mediatization. Populism as a political style
depends on meditization to perpetuate, where the constant performance of populist actors allows
for the spread of populism. Mediatization means that political actors can reach out to their
publics easier than before. A video or an image in the populist style can be sent immediately to
the public, then as users interact and see it, they take part in the decision if they are included in
that ‘people’. I think of what my Precalculus teacher used to say, that ‘common sense is not so
common’. In the populist lense, ‘the common sense’ is slippery and is only fulfilled when some
populist actor performs what you deem as your ‘common sense’. The content of populism is
embodied by what the ideals or fears of the given populist actor might be, but it nonetheless is a
performative act. The new and social media technologies behind each screen, or otherwise
known the opaque operations of populism, allow it to spread.
Although Moffitt’s application of mediatization is utilized to populism as a political style,
it is important to populism as a political style, it is a process that has more depth than that
(Shroeder 2018). Behind the phone screens, computers and searches we have come to depend on,
a system of technological developments are components in the rise of global populism.
Computation has always been understood as one of mankind's greatest achievements. Our
technology while augmenting us has been simultaneously shaping us. In what James Bridle
describes as “computational thinking”, this way of thinking is a kind of solutionism, that any
problem can be solved with adjunct of computation (2018, 4). Computational thinking is
plaguing modern societies, for we forget to realize the mechanisms behind the way we are
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informed by computation. The information we see on a screen doesn't clearly show us how it got
there, what operations codified this content for it to reach the user. Computation is progressively
infiltrating our social lives, where our lives are “mediated through connectivity and algorithmic
revision” (Bridle 2018, 38). A news feed that pops up on your device is not a neutral stream of
information, rather it is content that has been coded towards you. T
 his happens for computation
is opacious in nature and increasingly complex, while also being viewed as both politically and
emotionally neutral (Bridle 2018, 40). Meaning that, as computation has evolved rapidly, there
are more and more operations happening behind the screen.With each step of the computation
process being opaque, shrouded behind screens, servers and remote buildings, we are not given
the political rationale on why the content you are seeing is there.
Computation serves as a cognitive hack. The brain when confronted with complex issues
makes the decision that requires the least amount of justification. The brain uses the process of
computation to offload the decision making and responsibility to the machine (Bridle 2018, 43).
We no longer think of a complex issue and consider other opinions when making the decision on
a topic, we back up our cognitive biases and reinforce them with “automation biases” (Bridle
2018, 43). Meaning that we search online in order to affirm our views, political, social or
otherwise. This serves particularly well into the populist actor’s hand for creating “sound byte
solutions” for the increasingly complex issues of the political realm. The populist actor actively
constructs their political style and technological systems serve as a way to circumvent traditional
gatekeepers in media. These systems serve as a modern adjunct of populism, that operate behind
the populist actor. Computational thinking serves a problematic feature of society for
information is not critically viewed and the technological systems in place that are allowing
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populism to circulate.
Methodology
This data was obtained through bibliographic research accessed through both the
CSUMB Library and Google scholar. Research was conducted from August of 2019 to February
of 2020. This paper draws on secondary sources to give insight into the relationship between
populism and technological systems, such as algorithms and how they shape echo chambers and
networked publics. I mainly draw from scholars with expertise in populism, political
communication, media studies, performance, technology and critical media studies to inform my
research. Primary sources include examples from media coverage to ground the theoretical
concepts I am articulating. I build off Benjamin Moffitt's theory of populism as a political style
in this paper. I think his theory has the most basis for conceptualizing contemporary populism. I
use his theoretical framework, but I find it necessary to apply perspectives on technology and the
technological systems of new media and social media that are at play. The political system
doesn't occur in a vacuum and the growth of the new media and social media’s roles are a vital
factor to consider. To expand on the work on populism as a political style, I will supplement the
theories of populism as a political style with a nuanced application of media technology theories
and technological systems. This research examines populism in this digital age along these levels
of analysis: national, transnational and global.
Discussion of Findings
Populism as a political style is a suitable argument, but doesn’t consider the technological
conditions that are all too important how we situate ourselves in the world. In our technological
age, our very own creation is shaping what content is shown and what isn’t. These are because of
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mathematical equations, known commonly as algorithms,which are a set of instructions
designed to perform a certain task (Christensen 2013). Constantly crafting what content is
shown, an equation is computing what is the most suitable outcome for the user. The populist has
a cyborg-like charisma, reaching ‘people’ from across the globe. Instead of finding their ‘people’
with a particular political message, populists now are actively and passively creating ‘the people’
with technology, known as a calculated public or networked publics (Gillespie 2014, 189).
Technology has hollowed out the phenomena of populism, for the empty signifier of the
‘people’ is now just part of our lives, which can be reduced to a set of equations (Crawford 2016,
77). Populism as a political style pays the most attention to the socio-technical conditions we are
in. Although Moffit gets close with an interpretation of “Mediatization” and populism, it doesn’t
elaborate on the new media and social media technologies and how they form virtual groups. In
our case, the availability of new media and social media, users are able to find groups of people
easier than ever before. These are a set of data points that can basically estimate ‘the people’
needed for the populist actor. There is also the phenomena of a filter bubble, where users tend to
only interact or associate with very like-minded people. The populist actor now has the reach of
technology, more specifically new and social media, can find their ‘people’ in this age of
darkness (KhosraviNik 2018).
In this section, I supplement Moffitt’s theory of populism as a political style. I argue that
we cannot explain any political phenomena without exploring the effects of new media social
technologies such algorithms, filter bubbles and echo chambers. Especially now that new media
and social media have taken such a strong hold of how people receive information. I claim that
populism as a political style is the next turn in the long history of the contested definition of this
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slippery phenomena of populism, but we need to pay attention to how the technology is actively
shaping and allowing this phenomena to perpetuate.
Returning to the definition of mediatization, “social interaction-within these institutions,
between institutions, and society at large-take place via the media'' (Hjarvard 2008,113). When
we consider the scarce amount of attention that each user has, populist actors have to work to get
that attention (Schroeder 2018, 3). Naturally, populism is able to thrive in this scenario, for the
performance of populism is supposed to cut through the noise or the darkness. The populist actor
can now frame arguments to reach exactly ‘the people’ they claim to represent. Traditional
media has gatekeepers that the new media, such as social media, are able to circumvent (Moffit
2016, 85). Anyone who has an account in these new media or social media platforms can interact
politically or socially, which can be picked up by a populist leader. Another thing to consider
about this Mediatization, even traditional media consumers who watch television news can
succumb to seeing the news that occurs on social media. Traditional media sources have a
tendency to take tweets or other social media posts and run it on the air (Moffit 2016, 90). So
now, the populist actor has their message that was catered for social media, it is then recycled to
go onto national television or other mainstream media. Instead of having to perform to ‘their
people’ on television, the populist actor can create their messages from their couch and if it gets
enough attention it will find its way into traditional media. The appeals to ‘the people versus the
elite’ or other related signifiers can now be performed with ease.
Populism can be seen as the nexus of media logic and political logic, where “politics is
increasingly influenced, shaped and colonised by media logic” ( Moffitt 2016, 76). Media logic
corresponds with populism as a political style quite well (see Figure 1.1). The media logics of
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dramatisation, polarisation and prioritisation of conflict serves as a backbone of the populist
political actor (Stromback 2008, 233; Bos, van der Berg and de Vreese 2011, 185). In this
process, one may ask if the rise of populism was due to the mediatization of politics or if
populism has helped allow mediatization to take place? I speculate populism as a praxis has
become more common because of the mediatization that has happened. I argue that the
technological systems behind our new media and social allow populism to replicate or
perpetuate. Moffitt’s application of mediatization within populism as a political style is vital.
However, this process is too passive and doesn’t include the various technological systems that
are embedded into our devices and the wider repercussions they have in public discourse. Our
phones, computers and media are constantly shaping who we hear from, allowing idealized
notion of the Habermasian Public sphere to erode almost entirely (Greenfield 2017, 25). Rational
debate has been degraded and the appeal to emotion is the new modus operandi. The
polarization, dramatization that has found through the mediatization of politics has
allowedpopulism to thrive (Moffitt 2016, 63). Populists are able to perform to their specific
‘people’ and attempt to solve complex problems with sound byte-solutions. We need to consider
the socio-technical conditions we are in and how prior conceptions of mediatization fall short.
See Figure 1.1
What needs to be conceptualized and examined in depth with regard to populism as a
political style is the role media technology plays in shaping this political style today. We almost
write our technology, computers, and smartphones off as a neutral tool. We conceptualize that
the information that we are accessing when we type something into a search engine will ping
results that are true and accurate. We think that computation technology has allowed this viral
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distribution of knowledge. This conception couldn’t be further from the actuality. The
computation technology has created a landscape where there is an almost unapproachable
amount of knowledge that exists. The technology we cherish, in some ways, has made us
actually know less. This is key to understanding populism as a political style, that we are existing
in a period of darkness. Now, I don’t mean darkness in the nihilistic sense, but not having a
clarity of what is in front us. We have created a system that has vast repositories of knowledge,
but limited ways to access that knowledge. We have created a chasm, as James Bridle calls it, of
knowledge. The abundance of information and “plurality of worldviews are not producing a
coherent consensus reality, but one riven by fundamentalist insistence on simplistic narratives,
conspiracy theories, and post-factual politics” (Bridle 2019,10). Populism as a political style is
able to thrive when there is so much uncertainty, a true crisis of public knowledge is at play and
operates as a crucial component to the global rise of populism.
Algorithms serve as a way to navigate ourselves through the digital realm in their most
basic sense. Algorithms also provide “a means to know what there is and how to know”
(Gillespie 2014, 167). In this sense, they are able to serve as a key logic for governing flows of
information, which we use to constitute what we know. Algorithms compute what is the ‘hot’ or
‘trending’ discussions or news, showing us what topics might be the most relevant to what we
are searching for. What these algorithms also do is stem the flow of which publics we participate
in. Gillespie calls these relevance algorithms (2014, 168). These specific set of algorithms help
us understand how contemporary populism operates. Algorithms are just equations trying to give
the user their desired output (Gillespie 2014, 180).These algorithms are not able to judge if they
are actually important to what is going on. These serve as pathways to understand culture,
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politics and other larger societal practices. “Our sense of the world is subtly conditioned by the
information that is presented to us for interested reasons, and yet doesn’t disclose those reasons”
(Greenfield 2017, 23). What these algorithms do is take data and crunch it. Our knowledge is
then codified, crunched for each user, meaning a clear consensus of reality is obfuscated by our
very own operational systems.
Gillespie describes is as, “algorithms nestle into people’s daily lives and mundane
information, users shape and rearticle the algorithms they encounter; and algorithms impinge on
how people seek information, how they perceive and think about the contour of knowledge, and
how they understand themselves in and through public discourse” (2014, 183). We see some
news trending or populist actors trending on Twitter or other new media and we misconstrue the
validity of the information with the visibility o f the information (KhosraviNik, 2018). As the
populist fights for attention in the media ecosystem, creating a crisis or performing, their content
comes to the forefront. Algorithms then codify the content entrenched in populism, making the
user beyond susceptible to what are known as calculated publics, which are the result of the
“intersection of people, technology, and practice” (Gillespie 2014, 188). We are then entrenched
both digitally and physically in populist style. We are then situated with users with similar
mindsets as people we are supposed to share an affinity with (Gillespie 2014, 188). We are now
being shaped socially by our own tool. Algorithms are shaping the world as we know it, allowing
for the populist to create their people through calculations rather than charisma.
Gramsci would rifle through his hair and turn over in his grave with this “crisis of
authority” we have with mainstream media (1971, 275). He was describing the crisis of
legitimacy that the Church and other institutions in the interwar period. Authority in this case is
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the mass distrust of the national news system, according to Pew Research Center with only 18%
of Americans having a lot of trust in national news organisations (Barthel and Mitchell, 2017).
This crisis of knowledge allows for the space for alternative news sites to be used and ultimately
circulated online. Alternative news sources can include everything from Breitbart, Infowars and
the likes. Populism has a tendency to attack the mainstream media, regardless of the ideology
behind it (Gerbaudo 2018, 749). Historically, the start of constant crisis cycling on the news was
first introduced following the events of 9/11. The ‘ticker’ was introduced at the bottom of
mainstream media sources, such as Fox News, CNN and MSNBC. The ticker circulated news
that was not dated and would run on constantly on the bottom of the mainstream media
broadcasts, The ticker of constant crisis was the predecessor of the online streams on Facebook,
Twitter and other new media sources. The media ecosystem has evolved as the digital streams
have shed our ability to have coherent stories of the world and heralded our era of paranoia
(Bridle 2019, 204).
Conspiracy theories seem to fit right into this and have found their way to the mainstream
because of populist actors. Hofstadter writing in 1964, noted the paranoid style of American
politics from Masonic and anti-Catholic panics of the 1800s to Senator Joe McCarthy’s
Communist conspiracies in the 1950s. This historical othering the American tradition and that
tradition has seeped into the global rise of populism. The enemy is “unlike the rest of us, the
enemy is not caught in the toils of the vast mechanism of history, or tries to deflect the normal
course of history” (Hofstadter 1964). The enemy or the other is not tied down to the complexities
of everyday life. They supersede the situation at hand to grasp the totality of it and are able to
manipulate it in ways that the rest of us are not capable of. This othering entrenched in paranoia
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has the capability to sound like a conspiracy before you know it. Conspiracies are an extreme
resort of the powerless, imagining what it would be like to be powerful (Bridle 2019, 205).
Conspiracies are the next tool in the contemporary populist tool belt. These conspiracy theories
are entirely possible with the networked society we are now tethered to.
Tin foil hats aside, this is a tragedy of public knowledge that is being circulated by
populists. Conspiracies are the “poor person’s cognitive mapping in the postmodern age; it is the
degraded figure of the total logic of late capital” (Jameson 1990). A failure that is possible when
slippage into theme and content. Simple narratives are the bread and butter of populism as a
political style in creating ‘their people’ and dramatisation of a crisis or threat. This championing
of ‘common sense’ and rejecting the bureaucrats, technocrats and other ‘Elites’ (Moffitt 2016,
14). Some commentators have called this stylistic choice “epistemological populism” (Saurette
2011, 199).The ‘common sense’ is the validated knowledge and helps appeal to the ‘common
people’ in populism. Simplistic narratives are used to try and gain control of the complexities.
The world as we know it is technologically augmented, accelerating the complexities of what we
know. Conspiracy theories are a violent attempt to regain control of what people know. “We are
networked, where knowledge wraps arounds us, simultaneously illuminating and disorientating
us” (Bridle 2019, 209). The tinfoil hat has found a new crown on President Donald Trump, who
most recently claimed that hydroxychloroquine when taken with azithromycin is effective in
treating the COVID-19 virus, which hasn’t been clinically tested. He stated in a press
conference, “What do I know? I’m not a doctor,” he added, “But I have common sense”(MSN,
2020).
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This is not the first time President Trump has flaunted conspiracy theories. Alex Jones,
who has hosted the right-wing conspiracy network Infowars, said “it was surreal to talk about
issues here on the air, and then word-for-word hear Trump say it two days later” (Bridle 2016,).
The lack of coherent reality for users in the media ecosystem is causing traditional psychological
models to become obsolete. The widely used definition of delusion, as according to Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders states that “a belief is not a delusion when it is held
by a person’s culture or subculture” (Bridle 2019, 208). The network to which we devoted much
of time makes it possible for the people who use it to seek out people with similar beliefs and
concerns across the globe and establish a virtual community to justify their beliefs and validate
their concerns. These networked communities of self-confirming groups are the echo chambers
of the modern populist.
Conclusion
In our media ecosystem, populism seems like one of the most effective ways to gain
attention. It gives a simple narrative to what are complex problems. The performativity of crisis
and appealing to the ‘common people’, it is almost like the populist has gained charisma by
becoming cyborg. Augmenting their ability to reach people across national boundaries and
connecting ‘people’ through algorithmic and symbolic revision. We need something to hold onto
in the age of unknowing, but we need to be critical of the algorithmic processes that are
constantly calculating ‘what we know’. The mediatization of politics allows for the easy to
understand populist policies to fit into sound bytes, simple solutions and framing of situations.
Moffitt’s theory of populism as a political style, where the populist actor performs a crisis,
appeals to a ‘common people’, and can resort to ‘bad manners’.
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We are in complex times, simple narratives will not solve the problems of contemporary
society. Our own technological systems are allowing populists to perform to their ‘people’. One
that is often based on paranoia and othering. Populism as a political style is the most cohesive to
theorize contemporary populism. It doesn’t get trudged down with universals, like populism as a
political logic. It also notes the graduational nature of the populist actor, meaning they can step
out of their performance of the populist style.
There needs to be more research on new media and social media, as we have seen, there
are corporations that are able to influence voters using the data points of the ‘calculated publics’
(Heawood 2018). Also more research on how media events cause the possibility of a ‘spreadable
spectacle’, when entrenched in these technological systems, we lack agency and the information
we see is based on other parties' decisions or calculations (Mihailidis 2017). These types of
‘spectacles’ can be used by a populist, for instance the moniker of President Trump is, “Make
America Great Again”. This is what is known as a “retrogression into a utopia”, these spectacles
that surround and shroud our knowledge of what’s outside our social life that is mediated by
algorithmic revision (Silva, 2018).
The processes, design, and rationale of how the information you are reading is opaque ,
there is always a ‘black box’ of algorithms that companies will keep in order to ‘stay on the
cutting edge’ (Greenfield 2017). Yet, these algorithms are capable of cutting up a consistent view
of reality, fragmenting us and allowing for violent conspiracies to fester. We rely on these
technological systems of algorithms, filter bubbles and the likes, as a logic and how we situate
ourselves in the world. Algorithms, computations and other technological systems are the opaque
operations of populism as a political style.
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